Henry Imler June 30th, 2005

Here are some notes from Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals by David Hume on what he called “Relation of Ideas” and “Matters of Fact.”

• Every idea that is intuitively or demostratively certain.
• Examples are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and other math, Logic
• Discoverable by thought - don’t rely of world being a certain way
• Demonsratively certain
• True regardless of experiance
• a priori to experiance
• Nessisarilly true
• They are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without thier dependance on what is existant in the universe

• contingently true
• a posteriori to experiance
• The contrary of every mater of fact is possible (does not have to happen though)
• True contingent upon how the world happens to be.
  Science
• Our knowledge of Matters of Fact beyond our immediate experiance relies on Cause and Effect

Relation of Ideas are:

• Uncontradictory
  For Example:
  • 3 X 5 = 1/2 X 30 - Is always true
  • 3 x 5 > 1/2 X 30 - Can never be true

On the other hand, with Matters of Fact it is:

• Possible to have contradiction
  For Example
  • Case A: The Sun will rise tommorow - Can happen
  • Case B: The Sun will not rise tommorow - Can happen (not likely, but it is possible

  .

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Henry Imler June 30th, 2005

Here are some notes from Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals by David Hume on what he called “Mental Contents.”

1. Thoughts and Ideas. Recalling the memory of situations, anticipating future ones
2. Impressions: They are perceptions of the mind that are the most clear. They include our more lively perceptions: when we hear, feel, love, hate, desire and will.
   1. Example: Being angry and thinking about being angry. What is the diffrence between the two?

1. “Impressions are distinguished from ideas when we reflect on any of our sensations or movements” (Page 10)
2. Impressions are the origin of ideas and thoughts; ideas are the reflection of impressions
3. Impressions are vastly more vivid and therefore more forcefull than ideas. “The most lively thought is still inferior than the dullest sensation” (Page 10)

1. The origin of all our ideas come from the senses.
   - Every idea is copied from a similar impression
   - When people are deprived of a sense since birth, they are unable to convice of the corresponding ideas (Blind people know no color, Deaf people know no sound)
2. Thoughts are a faithful mirror of impressions. They are only copies.
3. All of our “creative” thoughts are merely the following operations involving basic ideas derived from the senses

1. Compounding (def: To combine so as to form a whole; mix.)
   - Golden Mountain = Gold + Mountain
2. Transposing (def: To put into a different place or order)
   - Rhino’s horn + Horse = Unicorn
3. Augmenting (def. To make (something already developed or well under way) greater, as in size, extent, or quantity)
   - [Ideas of Goodness and Wisdom] X [infinity] = God
4. Diminishing (def. # To make smaller or less or to cause to appear so.)

All ideas are naturally faint and obscure. It is easy to confuse one idea with another, they are not very distint. However, all impressiosn are stong and vivid. They are clear and very will defined. It is not easy to fall into error about them. When it comes to ideas we need to inquire: “From what impression does the idea come from?” (page 13) If we are not able to find a impression, then it is not meaningful

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Henry Imler June 1st, 2005

The Cultural Revolution

In 1976 the Gang of Four was arrested by the Chinese government. Their arrest marked the end of a great social experiment of their predecessor, Mao Zedong, called the Cultural Revolution. The outcome of the experiment would haunt China for many years. It was one of the great failures of social engineering. The Cultural Revolution was an attempt by Mao to cleanse and revitalize the communist revolution in China.

In 1957, Mao Zedong called for what he considered to be the next step in China�s march to �being.� He wanted to accelerate the industrialization of China in order to usher in the next phase of China�s progression towards the communist ideal. At the time they were in Marx�s �Dictatorship of the Proletariat;� Mao wanted China to advance into Marx�s next phase, �Actual Socialism.� In order to do this, China needed to undergo a full industrial revolution in only a few years time. Several factors lead to the failure of Mao�s Great Leap Forward. First of which, was a general mismanagement of the project, perhaps due to its immensely large scale. Secondly, most of the people were so afraid of admitting failure that they hid the problem, allowing it to go undetected and snowball into something much worse. Thirdly, with so much emphasis going into the industrialization of China the agricultural needs of China went under-attended. This failure, coupled with the “Three Years of Natural Disaster” lead to wide-spread criticism of Mao from underneath him within the communist party itself. Several leaders within the government instituted reforms that began to win the people�s support. These leaders began to arrange for Mao to be retired.

Mao saw this as not only a threat to himself, but a threat to the entire communist endeavor. His response to this was to purge the party and later the nation of elements counter to the revolution. One of the first elements of his reaction was the Social Education Movement in 1963. Its emphasis was to be on �restoring ideological purity, re-infusing revolutionary fervor into the party and government bureaucracies, and intensifying the class struggle.�:”Chaos at Maryland(The People�s Republic of China: III. April 25, 2005. )”:http://www-chaos.umd.edu/history/prc3.html The Social Education Movement gradually morphed into the Four Clean-ups Movement:”Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought(a Red Guard Publication Mao Tse-tung Talk On The Four Clean-ups Movement)”:http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9_38.htm which was aimed at cleansing the government of China of elements counter to the revolution. These elements were, in fact the very people who had previously challenged him. Along with these, other movements were introduced with the same goal: to purify the party. Among these other movements was the January Storm, where Shanghai�s leaders that did not toe Mao�s party line were purged. Mao used the People�s Daily, the national newspaper to promote his views. On June 1, 1966 the paper relayed Mao�s dictum that all �imperialists, people with affiliations with imperialists, imperialistic intellectuals, et.al., must be purged.� :”Wikipedia(�The Cultural Revolution � Influences Elsewhere�.)”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_Revolution Interestingly enough, it was Mao�s section of the party that determined who were those that needed to be purged. While the underpinnings of Mao�s revolution has been boiling for a few years, it is with the People�s Daily�s pronouncement that marked the official start of the Cultural Revolution.

During the revolution many mass purges were instituted. Many of these were aimed at the intellectuals and people who had bourgeois tenancies. In attempting to purify the party, Mao gutted his country of those that were best able to run it. Just as any society that destroys its best and brightest suffers for it, so did China. People that were able to see what better course China and the Communist Party might take were seen as deviating from the party line and thus were purged. The result of this was a government whose members either blindly agreed with Maoism or were too afraid to speak out. The purges were carried out by members of the �Red Guards.� The Red Guard was the official enforcers of the purges. Gradually, the powers and numbers of the Red Guard expanded. At each step Mao tried to make the party more and more pure. In August of 1966 Mao officially freed the Red Guard from police scrutiny. In effect, the Red Guard was now above the law. The Red Guard�s tactics grew increasingly brutal. The result of their brutality was mass chaos. In addition to their reign of terror on the population, they expanded their targets to include the past relics of China�s history.:”Wikipedia(�The Cultural Revolution � Massive Purges�.)”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_Revolution The reaction to the mass purges and atrocities committed by the Red Guard was riots and a general state of chaos thought China. The rule of law was lost towards the populace and they responded in kind towards the government with a lack of respect of its laws.

In an attempt to counteract the loss of control, Mao, in 1968 began to promote himself via the government�s education mechanism, as the source of sustenance for the Chinese. By the end of this campaign, he was being promoted as being divine, playing on the ancient Chinese traditions that spoke of the leader being promoted by the gods and even taking part in that divinity.

Those around Mao saw the chaos and sought to take advantage of the situation. Lin Biao attempted a failed military coup in 1971. After the betrayal by his successor and support eroding away, Mao turned to those he had once exiled. In this he was able to retain power until his death in 1976. With his death, reaction to Mao�s policies sought to undo much of the harm that was done to the populace and to reinvigorate the economy.

Comparison with the Revolutions Presented in Class

The Cultural Revolution closely mirrors the latter stages of the French revolution. The Jacobins, behind the leadership of Robespierre, attempted to create their �pure society.� Likewise the Cultural Revolution, behind the leadership of Mao sought to purify their society. With the death of Mirabeau, Robespierre began small, by simply trying to keep the Revolution on course. This led him to try to establish his �Republic of Virtue.� Mao attempted to purify his party in order to lead the Chinese to true socialism. In order to accomplish this Robespierre created the �Committee of Public Safety.� This same sentiment is echoed in Mao�s Red Guard. The purges in both revolutions continued there was never a sense of completion. Instead of the job being completed, there was a sense of refining the inner limit of the purge to higher and higher standard. In each case, the result was that the grasp on control spun from the hands of those who wished to keep it via the purges. In both situations each tried to set up their own religion, one that did not set with the people. Robespierre had his deism and with its �Temples of Reason.� Mao on the other hand, in an attempt to regain control and confidence of his populace began the �Cult of Personality.� Most importantly, both placed the importance of adherence to the ideal over the importance of a real progression of the goals of their movements. At the end of their lives, both Mao and Robespierre�s ideas spurred counter-revolutions that sought to repair the damage to society that they had done. The Republic of Virtue was succeeded by the reforming Directory and then by the strongman Napoleon; the Cultural Revolution was succeeded by Deng Xiaoping who was both the restorer of the purged and the strongman of Tiananmen Square.

Elements of Revolutionary Ideas in the Cultural Revolution

Most revolutions, while differing substantially, share a variety of common characteristics. Amongst the more common denominators are the following six properties:

1. an idea that seeks comprehensive change,
2. faith in the idea is first held in the intellectuals,
3. the idea has a radical simplicity that is often communicated via journalism,
4. there is a heavy use of symbols,
5. similarity with the Prometheus myth, and
6. similarity with the cult of Pythagoras.

Did the Cultural Revolution embody any of these common characteristics? Certainly Mao�s idea that the current communist party was in disarray and needed to be radically re-aligned smacks of an idea that seeks comprehensive change. The second criterion does not seem to apply to the Cultural Revolution. As a matter of fact, the intellectuals of 1960�s China were one of the prime bearers of the purges.

Maoism�s goal was very straight forward. It sought to correct the wayward drift of the communist party in China. In fact, it can be argued that it was too straight forward, too simple in that it blindly followed itself without looking at the larger picture and lost sight of its ultimate goal. This simple idea was communicated very effectively by the journalists that were employed by the protagonist of the Cultural Revolution. While the involvement of the press is a common characteristic in Revolution, the journalists are often seeking to change society on their own accord. In the Cultural Revolution, on the other hand, the press was owned and coerced into manipulating the people.

For all of his policy failings, Mao Zedong was able to work the minds of his populace through his propaganda machine. Chinese propaganda posters are famous for their effective use of symbols. While varying from the western set of symbols, the Maoist propaganda posters used symbols that spoke to the heart of the Chinese culture. Take for instance the poster entitled �A New Flowering of Village Culture; Scientific Farming Methods Will Yield Great Fruits� in the figure above. It is interesting to note that the Maoists were using the people�s identity with their cultural roots to undermine and replace the cultural roots. With the propagation of the Cult of Personality, images of Mao often conveyed the sense of the divinity of Mao and depicted him in poses that made him look like a wise father of the people. Here, Mao is the depicted as the red sun and his people are happy ones.
In relation to the Prometheus myth, Mao used the Social Education Movement to instill in the students the will to rebel against their teachers and to accuse them and have them purged. There were no closed door secret sessions reminiscent of the Pythagoras Cult. Instead this principle was turned on its head in the Cultural Revolution. It was only the proponents of the Cultural Revolution and could air their thoughts.
This Revolution sought something new at its heart, the assertion from the dictatorship of the people to the actual socialism of Marxist theory. In this sense, the fulfillment of Marx�s true revolution of the human character, Maoism sought a break from the past. He sought for the people to �be�, rather than simply �becoming� as all humans had prior to them. However, that was merely the dream of Mao insofar as he was a communist. His attempt to fulfill that mission resulted in his revolution, distinct from the one that Marx envisioned. Mao�s revolution was indeed the embodiment of the idea of the return. For Mao the return was to basic communist principles, to be later used in the full revolution of Marxism.

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Henry Imler June 1st, 2005

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In the wake of Hume�s works, Metaphysics, as an objective philosophical discipline, was left in chaos. When applied correctly, Hume striped causality of its power and prestige. Metaphysics, the study of the underlying nature of the world, heavily relies on the idea of causation being intelligible. Hume argued that all meaningful ideas came from the senses and because we could not actually sense the causation of an event, our idea of causality in each specific occasion is unfounded. It was this difficulty that spurred Kant to rethink Metaphysics in general.

Kant tries to establish a set of founding principals on which to rest the foundations of Metaphysics. In doing so, he establishes four types of propositions: a priori, a posteriori, analytic, and synthetic. The first two deal with the origin of the proposition. A priori propositions are known from pure reason, whereas a posteriori propositions are known from experience. The last two types describe the relation of the predicate and the subject of the sentence. Analytic propositions contain in the predicate, knowledge that is known in the subject. Synthetic propositions on the other hand add the idea in the predicate to the subject. There are four possible combinations of the four types of propositions: a priori analytic, a posteriori analytic, a priori synthetic, and a posteriori synthetic. A priori analytic statements and a posteriori synthetic exist; their very definition allows them to necessarily exist.

A posteriori analytic propositions are impossible, for each of the terms exclude the other. Kant believes that Math, Science and Metaphysics lie in the last type, a priori synthetic propositions. It is questionable that this class of propositions exists. If it is not possible, then Metaphysics, as a science, cannot exist. If Kant can demonstrate that the class of a priori synthetic propositions does exist, by letting Math in, then he can use the same principles to allow Metaphysics to exist through a priori synthetic propositions. Kant uses a priori intuitions for a priori synthetic propositions in his first remark in the first part of the Prolegomena. His argument for the validity of a priori synthetic propositions of space and time are as follows.

1. A priori intuitions are known outside of experience.
2. Pure Geometry is an a priori intuition of space.
3. Pure math is an a priori intuition of time.
4. (C1). Pure Geometry and Pure Mathematics are known outside of experience.

5. Pure Geometry and Pure Mathematics are known outside of experience.
6. Pure Geometry and Pure Mathematics are the form of our ability to experience space and time.
7. Objects of sense are bundles of our experiences of space and time.
8. (C2). Pure Mathematics and Pure Geometry refers merely to objects of sense.

9. Pure Mathematics and Pure Geometry can only have objective reality on the condition that it refers merely to objects of sense.
10. Pure Mathematics and Pure Geometry refers merely to objects of sense.
11. (C3). Pure Mathematics and Pure Geometry have objective reality.

12. Pure Mathematics and Pure Geometry have objective reality.
13. Pure Geometry is an a priori intuition of space.
14. Pure math is an a priori intuition of time.
15. (C4). Pure Geometry and Pure Mathematics are necessarily valid of space and time.

Is the conclusion, Pure Geometry and Pure Mathematics are necessarily valid of space and time, true? In Kant�s view, three-dimensional geometry, or Euclidean geometry, is only possible form of space. However, with the onset of Einstein�s Relativity, we have learned that our previous intuitions about space and time were wrong; space is really four-dimensional and does not follow rules of Euclidean Geometry. This demonstrates the conclusion of Kant�s argument to be false.
Where in the chain of reasoning is the error? It is located in the original intuitions. The a priori intuitions that give rise to Pure Geometry, otherwise known as Euclidean Geometry, are incorrect. Our reasonings of the structure of space and of time were incorrect. If the reasonings before experience about time and space are wrong, what prevents the reasonings, or a priori synthetic propositions, before experience about the nature of experience to be incorrect also? If the reasonings about the nature of experience are also incorrect, then one is unable to correctly interpret experience. Once the interpretation of experience is rendered baseless, the foundation on which to build the science of Metaphysics disappears.

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Henry Imler June 1st, 2005

Traditionally, the search for personhood has centered on trying to stake out who holds moral responsibility for his or her actions. The search for a comprehensive notion of personhood often has a deeper goal: to discover who has a right to life. As Michael Tooley puts it, “What properties must something have to be a person, i.e., to have a right to life?”[i] A common definition of personhood is the moral community requirement. If X is morally responsible for the actions of X, then X is a member of the moral community. If X is a member of the moral community, then X is a person. However, from an intuitional standpoint, the moral community requirement runs into several serious problems. This paper seeks to explore these problems, as well as present an alternate view that more readily accounts for our intuitions on whom has a right to life.This alternate view claims that the moral community theory has, at its center, a faulty view of personhood, one that does not properly distinguish between moral subjects and moral objects. Instead, one should view both moral objectivity and moral subjectivity as two different criteria for two distinct types of personhood.

The Moral Community Requirement

Mary Anne Warren in her work “The Moral and Legal Status of Abortion” puts forth the moral community requirement for personhood. Her position is that a fetus is not a person, and therefore, does not have a right to life. In order for her to say what a person is not, she presents the minimum requirements for what a person must be like. Any being that does not meet these necessary requirements is not a person. Like most careful scholars, Warren is quick to point out that humanity is not being discussed within this debate.Humanity only signifies the genetic homogeny of the human race; yet there is no reason to suspect that persons are limited to humans. Conversely, it has yet to be convincingly shown that being human grandfathers one into the class of persons. This opens the hypothetical door for advanced computer programs, alien life and any other being that meets her to be named requirements. Warren is quick to establish the premise that personhood is synonymous with membership in the moral community. She explicitly states that “the moral community consists of all and only people…”[ii] (emphasis added.) The moral community is then defined as “the set of beings with full and equal moral rights.”[iii] She finds it useful to imagine an alien culture and try to build the minimum requirements that members of that race would need to be persons. She gives a list of five minimum requirements of personhood. The following is her admittedly “rough” list of possible criteria: consciousness (namely the ability to feel pain), reasoning, self-motivated behavior, the ability or the capacity to communicate, and the presence of self-concepts and self awareness.[iv] Warren is not giving a hard criterion into which persons fall, she is only saying that any being that does not have any of these characteristics is not a person.[1] What is important to note is the moral community/personhood conjunction that Warren outlines. In his work “The Right to Life,” H. J. McCloskey argues a more concrete definition of what a person is. He maintains that only autonomous beings may have rights:[v] the main right being in question is the right to life.[vi] One that has the ability to freely choose his moral actions is a person under this view. Such a person would also by definition be considered a member of the moral community, a denotation of both the right to life and moral responsibility for his actions. The argument in its positive formulation is as follows:

1. All and only moral subjects are persons

2. X is a moral subject.

C. Therefore, X is a person.

In this view if a person is not a member of this moral community at time1, then it is not a person at time1, even though it will be a person at time2 or was a person at time0. The being’s rights are tied to its immediate membership in the moral community.[2]

Problems with the Moral Community Requirement

Intuitionally, this position runs into problems. As stated above, a person must be able to make moral judgments. Consider the following three beings: a health woman of forty-five years, a twelve year old boy, and a three month old baby. What do one’s intuitions tell us about each being having a right to life? Most would say that each have a clear right to life. Compare the intuitional results with the results dictated by the moral community requirement. Clearly, the woman of forty five years of age would be able to make moral judgments as would the young boy. Under the moral community requirement, they both would receive a right to life. Now, consider the three month old child. It is clear that he or she cannot make moral judgments, and therefore does not have a right to life. Nevertheless, it seems from an intuitional standpoint that for one to kill the three month old child would be barbaric. Some would even claim that the killing of the baby would be worse than the killing of the boy or the woman. This impasse demonstrates the inadequacy of the moral community requirement for defining who has a right to life.

The problem with the moral community position is that it entangles the concepts of moral objectivity and moral subjectivity. For one to be a moral subject is for one to make moral judgments. A moral object, on the other hand, is the object of moral considerations, such as the right to life. Moral objects that have a right to life are considered persons in the objective sense, or personsO. It might be the case that not all moral objects have the right to life. All moral subjects, on the other hand, are persons in the subjective sense, or personsS. There is a very important distinction between these two concepts, personsS and personsO, and one that is not often presented in the personhood debate. So far, the personhood debate has centered on demonstrating that all personsS have a right to life. Anyone that maintains the moral community requirement for personsO must maintain that the only beings that have to respect rights were the only ones that have rights that to be protected. Speculation on how to discern whether or not a being is a personOS and personsO. If it was the case that the being could make moral judgments, then obviously he or she is a personO. Since he or she was a personO, he or she must therefore also had a right to life. The argument, in its negative structure, can be formalized in its basic form as follows: centers on how to tell if the being was capable of making moral judgments, since there was not a distinction between persons

1. All moral subjects are personsO.

2. X is not a moral subject.

C. Therefore, X is not a personO.

There has not been a sufficient justification for the assumption that all personsO are personsS. The distinction between being a moral object and being a moral subject is quite a substantial one from an ontological standpoint. To illustrate this point, consider and analogy of the visual subject/object relationship and the moral subject/object relationship. Imagine for a moment, a well developed cow. Like all cows, it is able to move, hear, see, and eat. While exercising these traits, the cow happens upon a stalk of corn. The cow sees the corn, but the corn is unable to see the cow. The cow is an example of a visual subject and visual object. As such, it is able to see and be seen. The corn, on the other hand, is merely a visual object. It is only able to be seen, for it cannot see. This example demonstrates that visual subjectivity and visual objectivity are not one-in-the-same. Likewise is true for moral objectivity and moral subjectivity. The ability to be seen is held in the visual object, not the visual subject. Switching to the other side of the analogy, the right to life is a property of the moral object, not the moral subject. All visual subjects are visual objects, while not all visual objects are visual subjects. This also is applicable to the two types of persons: personsO and personsS.

At this point, it is important to make a few observations. The terms personS and personO merely coincide accidentally in the sharing of the root “person.” They do not relate directly, for they differ ontologically. As such, there are different requirements for each denotation. Each one points to entirely different qualities of a being. Since moral subjectivity and moral objectivity differ ontologically, then both follow that the rights and duties associated with each also differ, as well as there being different methods for their discovery. The moral community membership requirement provides sufficient justification for distinguishing beings of the class personsS. However, criteria for personsO have not been sufficiently explored. Following from the intuitional exploration above for the refutation of the moral community requirement as a comprehensive personhood criteria, intuitions of what beings have the right to life will be explored to attempt to uncover possible personO criteria.

Intuitions, Reasons and Moral Principles

One needs to be careful with intuitions, for they can easily play tricks on reason. One may appeal to them, but then one must be able to test them with reason to ascertain their validity. For example, in the “Owl and the Pussycat”, the reader recalls intuitions about owls, orangutans, and cats. The author then demonstrates that the intuitions about the personhood of these creatures are really just simple phenomenological and psychological effects tied to the resemblance of eyes similar to our own.[vii] A seemingly basic intuition can be demonstrated to be false. Similarly, when analyzing related personhood topics, one may allow his or her intuitions to be his or her guide, but the intuitions must able to be double checked for validity.

Moral Objectivity

With the above principles in mind the following can be made: 1) that there is a significant difference between being a moral object and a moral subject, and 2) that intuitions can point the way, but must be backed up by reason; one can make progress in determining criteria for personsO. What can intuitions about objective personhood reveal? From an intuitional standpoint, the qualifications for personO are not nearly as clear as those for personsS. Yet on the topic of moral subjectivity, our intuitions are quite clear. When one pictures a visual subject, or an audible subject, one must picture something that can see or hear. Likewise, when one pictures a moral subject, one must see in their mind’s eye a being that has the capability to make moral judgments. The next step is to ask what is required to make moral judgments. Here, the classical argument for discovering the requirements of personhood, such as McCloskey’s, becomes extremely valuable.

What about moral objects? The principle quality of a person in the objective sense is its right to life.Therefore, one’s intuitions on the topic are activated by asking, “Does this being have a right to life?” When the answer to the question is yes, the being in question is a moral object. It is hoped that the exploration of these intuitions will aid in smoking out the underlying cause that gives rise to a being having a right to life. Recall the three subjects from earlier: the healthy woman of forty-five years, the twelve year old boy, and the three month old baby. Begin by asking of each subject, “Is it morally permissible to arbitrarily kill him or her?” As before, with the woman and the young boy one is clearly able to answer, “No.” So far the previous possible moral objects have been undisputed moral subjects, who, are by their virtue of being able to make moral determinations, are objects of moral considerations. Consider the being that is not a moral subject. Is it morally wrong to arbitrarily kill a baby of three months? Once again, most will exclaim, “No,” with considerable fervor. Curiously though, a healthy number of people will consider the killing of the three month old baby a worse offense than the killing of the forty-five year old woman. Now, reduce the age of the subject even more. Is the killing of a two week old fetus morally wrong? Here the symmetry of intuitions breaks down. Some will give their “yays” and others their “nays.” After almost universal agreement on the previous examples, what could cause such a break down? There seems, from a personS standpoint, no ontological difference between the newborn and the fetus. Larvor, in “The Owl and the Pussycat,” suggests that this breakdown in intuition has psychological roots. Persons whose intuitions say the fetus is not a personO more than likely have a psychological reaction to the dissimilarity between fetuses and adults.Conversely, persons whose intuitions claim the opposite are having a psychological reaction to the similarity of fetuses to adults. Having identified this breakdown of intuition, which intuition is the correct one? Which one stands up to reason? The answer lies in our intuitions about the baby of three months.

Marquis in “Why Abortion is Immoral,” asks that instead of debating what is and what is not a person,[3] His conclusion is that killing is wrong because it robs the being of all future choices. He also notes that taking away all possible future choices takes away all possible rights, since the exercise of rights depends of the choice to enable or disable the right. Therefore, to kill a creature and thus rob him or her of all future choice and exercise of rights is the worst possible harm one can inflict on the creature. In Marquis’s analysis, the fact that a being has a future like ours entitles him or her to a right to life. In the case of the newborn, it is morally wrong to kill him or her because he or she will have future choices that significantly like ours that will be robed from her. Just as the moral community argument laid out a method of determining who is a personS, Marquis has laid out a method of determining the moral objectivity of a person. This principle explains why the life of a newborn is morally significant, even though it is not a person in the subjective sense. one should consider why killing is wrong.

Marquis does not say what it is about a future like ours that makes it morally significant.[viii] The moral considerability of having a future like ours is merely a consequent of what lies behind Marquis’ curtain. What might lie behind this curtain? If one borrows a page from the moral subjectivity argument and say that the ability to make moral choices is what makes a future like ours valuable, then the pieces fall into place. The argument can be given as follows:

1. A future has value if the subject will have the ability to make moral determinations.

2. X, in his or her future will have the ability to make moral determinations.

C1. Therefore, X’s future has value.

1. Subjects with valuable futures are personsO.

2. X’s future is valuable.

C3. Therefore, X is personO.

1. PersonsO have a right to life.

2. X is a personO.

C4. Therefore, X has a right to life.

In this view, the status of the person from a temporal standpoint is largely ignored[4]. A good consequence of the view is that if X is a moral agent, or will have the ability to become moral agent, then X’s life is worth moral consideration. This view is helpful because it explains why the life of a young child should be protected. This argument is a type of potentiality argument for personhood. However, it does not fall prey to the criticisms that its cousins do. Just as Marquis’ argument sidestepped the standard potential personhood criticism by applying the same principle to current persons and to potential persons alike, so does this formulation.

Conclusion

When one makes the proper distinction between personhood in its subjective sense and personhood in its objective sense, the prior inhibitions to the personhood debate fall away. The distinction clears up the intuitional problem of why a baby has a right to life, even though he or she is not a member of the moral community. Using the above criteria for determining personsO clearly confirms intuitions about the right to life of babies, and it even gives clear criterion for the right to life of a fetus. Interestingly enough, this argument renders the concept of personhood in the subjective sense irrelevant within the right to life debate. While the concept of personhood in the subjective sense is applicable in other areas of ethics, such as agency, it is not needed at all in the right to life debate for all personsS are also personsO in the aboveview. All that is necessary is to determine if the being is a person in the objective sense.

• Ethics
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Henry Imler June 1st, 2005

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Don Marquis, in Why Abortion is Immoral, attempts to give an alternate approach to the abortion debate. Prior arguments about the morality of abortion have centered on whether or not the fetus is a person. This approach assumes that only persons have rights. The protection of one�s life is a right. Thus it would seem to follow that the only beings who have a right to life are persons. Consequently, if a fetus is a person they would have a right to life and conversely, if a fetus is not a person, it does not have a right to life.

Marquis takes a look at the flaws in this approach, noting the problems that each side has. The standard anti-abortionist principle is that it is always prima facie wrong to take a human life. A fetus is a human; therefore it is wrong to kill a fetus. This stance, however, also demands that a cancer culture has a right to life:”(Marquis, Don. Why Abortion is Immoral. The Right Thing to Do. P.109)”:. Such a stance is absurd. The standard pro-abortionist principle is that it is prima facie wrong to take the life of persons, i.e. rational agents:”(Marquis, abid)”:. A fetus is not a rational agent, thus it is not wrong to kill it. This view, however, must allow for the killing of all non-rational agents, such as babies and severely retarded. This natural application of the standard pro-abortionist view, like its opposition, leads to moral absurdities.
Instead of attempting to discern the personhood of the fetus, Marquis notes that we are not ultimately asking if the fetus is a person, but rather, if it is morally permissible to kill the fetus. He then says that he knows for sure that it is wrong to kill him. He seeks to find out why and then apply that principle to the case of the fetus. His argument is as follows:

1.I value my future
2.To rob me of what I value is wrong
C.It is wrong to rob me of my future
1.Killing me robs me of my future
2.It is wrong to rob me of my future
C.It is wrong to kill me.
1.I value my futures
2.X will value its future
C. X has a future similar to mine.
1.X has a futures similar to mine.
2.It is wrong to kill me.
3.My intuitions say that it is wrong to kill X
C. It is wrong to kill beings with futures similar to mine.
1.It is wrong to kill beings with a future similar to mine.
2.A fetus has a future similar to mine
C.It is wrong to kill a fetus

The problem for Marquis is his transition from the specific to the general. He is attempting to take a reason of why it is wrong to kill him specifically, create a general rule, and then apply that rule to beings that are different than him. In the third section of the argument, he states that it is wrong to kill beings with a future similar to his. His reasons for this are that it is wrong to kill him and that his intuitions say that it is also wrong to kill X, Y and Z. Restated, this argument can be presented as follows:

1.X and Y share trait H
2.It is wrong to do action A both X and Y
C. Therefore, it is wrong to do A to beings with trait H

However, this does not follow. It may be that having trait H is a purely accidental correlation to the moral impermeability of action A. Consider the following: person A’s hair is stripped. person A’s cat is striped. It is wrong to burn both person A’s hair and person A’s cat. Therefore, one should not burn things that are striped. It does not follow that just because two things share two similar traits, that similar morality of actions done to the two things are a result of that trait. Continuing from the case above, imagine I owned a sheet of striped paper. It would then follow that it was morally impermissible to burn my sheet of striped paper because it was striped. That is, of course, absurd. The moral impermissibility of burning the first two items is their belonging within the set of items that belongs to person A, not their stripedness. The same holds for Marquis’ transfer of the moral impermeability of killing myself, X, and the fetus. The moral impermissibility of the killing of those items does not lie within the future valuing of their futures, but within their belonging to a certain set of beings, namely that set of beings with a right to life. Marquis is on the right path, but his argument went astray in his over generalization of an accidental trait into a general principle. The outcome of futures is merely an accidental quality of the type of beings the generator of the future is. While the futures of two beings may be similar, there is no reason to suspect that the similarity is what determines the worth of a being’s life.

The only way for Marquis to make his argument work is to fully argue for the distinction between moral objects and moral subjects. Moral subjects are the classical products of personhood theory, i.e. the rational agents that have the ability to make moral judgments. Moral objects, on the other hand, are the beings that have rights to be protected, in other words, they are the objects that moral subject must respect. Marquis needs to take this subject/object distinction and inject it into the personhood debate. He wants to steer clear of this, but without a full commitment, his view does not work. In discussing the implications of his theory, he brushes against what might save his theory. In talking about animals that might have futures similar to adult humans, he says the following, �Whether some animals do have the same right to life as human beings depends on adding to the account of the wrongness of killing some additional account of just what it is about my future or the futureness of other adult human beings which makes it wrong to kill us:”(Marquis, abid. p. 111)”:.� This �additional account� is the creation of a the moral object subsection of personhood. When he is able to create this criteria he will be able to correct his argument.

What might this �additional account� be? One needs to be able to speak of the beings on an ontological basis, not an accidental one. The only ontological property that the being would need in order to have a future value of it’s future is to, at some point in its natural development, have the ability to hold valuations of things. That is, to be a person in the subject sense. Such a view would be able to steer clear Marquis’ current problems. If this approach was taken, his argument would be as follows:

1.Moral objects are beings who, at sometime in their natural temporal existence have the ability to make moral choices.
2.X has the ability at some point in its natural temporal existence to make moral choices
C.Therefore X is a moral object.
1.All moral objects have a right to life
2.X is a moral object.
C.X has a right to life.

This approach yields the same results as his argument, such as the explanation of why infants have a right to life even though they are not persons in the subjective sense. However, it does not fall prey to his current objections.

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Henry Imler June 1st, 2005

A man approaches a bus stop and begins to read his newspaper. A second man stands next to him, staring blankly ahead, anticipating the long, cold ride home. As the bus approaches, a young child, the age of eight, has wandered away from his parent and is seen by both men to be standing in the path of the bus, frozen in fear. The first man bolts across the sidewalk and scoops up the child before it was too late. The second man congratulates the first and wonders to himself why he was not the one to be the hero. What was the cause of the first man’s actions? What was the cause of the second man’s inaction? Were they determined beforehand? Was each a free choice? This is the problem of free will: “Are man’s actions freely made, or are they subject to causes and conditions like everything else?” If man is free to choose his actions, as most want to believe, then he is responsible for them. However, if man’s actions are determined, then how can one be made to bear the responsibility for those actions? The notion of freedom is so engrained in the values of our culture; that to suggest that all of our actions, from the basic decisions to major life altering choices, are all a fa’ade; is a very troubling notion.

Immanuel Kant summed up his version of the problem in the Prolegomena in the third antinomy in this way:

“Thesis:There are in the world causes through freedom.

Antithesis:There is no freedom, but all is nature. “

The only two logical possibilities were that either freedom exists, or did does not exist and the world is purely casual. He proposed an interesting solution to the problem. He maintained that both could be true at the same time. This seeming contradiction is possible if each of the statements is applied to different worlds, the Noumenal and the Phenomenal. If this is correct, how does it play out? What is the structure of such a case? These are the questions that will be answered in this paper.

Background to the Problem

Kant contrasts this view in the Prolegomena, his companion piece to the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Prolegomena, Kant attempts to answer the question, “Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all possible? ” Metaphysics as a science had been called into question by the Empiricists, most notably, David Hume. Kant took their arguments with the weight worthy of their reasoning. The Scottish philosopher Hume had presented philosophy with a grand problem. Hume had tilled the grounding of the current metaphysics of the day. He had taken the postulates of Descartes and questioned them. He found the evidence for causality in the specific lacking, rendering one unable to point to the exact cause behind any certain event. Like all Empiricists, Hume wanted all philosophical systems to be grounded in immediate experience. He defined the two types of mental concepts, impressions and thoughts and ideas. Thoughts and Ideas are the recalling the memory of situations, and the anticipating future ones. An example of this is thinking about being angry. Impressions on the other hand, are perceptions of the mind that are the most clear. They include our more lively perceptions: when we hear, feel, love, hate, desire and will. An example of this is being angry. The difference is that “impressions are distinguished from ideas when we reflect on any of our sensations or movement. ”

All ideas for Hume are naturally faint and obscure. It is easy to confuse one idea with another, they are not very distinct. However, all impressions are strong and vivid. They are clear and very will defined. It is not easy to fall into error about them. When it comes to ideas we need to inquire: “From what impression does the idea come from? ” If we are not able to find an impression, then it is not meaningful. Hume maintained that our idea of causality could not be drawn back to any direct impression of cause and therefore the idea of causality is rendered meaningless. Our notion of causality is a mere by product of “constant conjunction”, or a habitual attachment.

Another impact of Hume had been on the categorization of ideas. He maintained that there were two divisions of thought, Relation of Ideas and Matters of Fact. Relation of ideas were discoverable by thought alone and as such, were a priori, they did not require the world to be a certain way to be true. Examples of this are math, logic and geometry. They were simply a relation between two thoughts. Take for instance the phrase, “All triangles have three sides.” The idea of triangles having three sides is contained in the word “triangles.” No experience of the world is needed to know that, it is purely definitional. The predicate is contained in the subject. Matters of fact, on the other hand are contingently true, that is they depend on the world existing in a certain way. Because they rely on experience for their validity, they are considered to be a posteriori. Because we do not know all possible experience, the contrary of each matter of fact is possible. The statements, “the sun will not rise tomorrow,” or, “the pot will not boil under high heat,” are possible, although not probable statements. Due to the case that matters of fact rely on experience all matters of fact that go beyond our immediate impressions are known through the “laws” of cause and effect. However, as demonstrated above, according to Hume we have no impression of causation, matters of fact that go beyond our immediate impressions are meaningless.

The Ideas of Kant

These ideas have serious ramifications for philosophy in general, and metaphysics in particular. Kant took these views to heart and found the fatal flaw in Hume’s reasoning. He had made a mistake in classification. He had classified everything into relation of ideas, or a priori statements, and matters of fact, or a posteriori statements. Kant said statements came in another flavor, synthetic and analytic. Hume had synthetic and analytic statements, but he had equated synthetic statements with the a posteriori class and the analytic statements with the a priori class. Kant took a hard look at math and said that there was no way that it was analytic and a priori. Math itself was a not an exercise in definitions, but instead was a creative, synthetic act, that joined together two previously unconnected ideas in an a priori way. For instance, nothing about the phrase five times five contains the equality with twenty five. The ideas are joined together, therefore they are synthetic; they also do not depend on how the world exists for validity, therefore they are also a priori. There could not be any a posteriori analytic statements because by definition, analytic statements contain in the subject what is in the predicate and therefore would not rely on the world for its validity. Kant, in one fell swoop, has laid the groundwork to completely circumvent Hume’s skeptically. Now that there is the possibility of a priori synthetic statements Kant is able see if metaphysics can be found with in that category.

In Kant’s search for metaphysics, he builds a unique view of space and time. Geometry is the pure intuition of space and math is the pure intuition of time. Not of anything in particular appearing in space or time, but the possible appearance of objects in space and time. The possibility of human experience is the big factor for Kant. For Kan it is the overarching rule. Causality is allowed because it is a necessary condition for the possibility of human experience. Human experience is still in the form of sensate intuitions from the outside world. These intuitions are our only link to the outside world. There are two consequences of this. First, since it is all we have to go off of, we might as will act as if it was truly representative of the world at large. Secondly, there will always be a buffer between us and the reality behind the sensate intuitions. The reality behind the world of appearances is described using a variety of terms. The two most common are “things in themselves” and the Noumenal world. Things in themselves refer to specific object affecting us through our senses. The Noumenal world is home to the extra phenomenal, or that that cannot be observed. Since the inhabitants of this realm cannot be observed, then surely reason must not be allowed to cross over. Kant considered such and exercises that overextend the bounds of reason and logic to be fruitless and said, “we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients said) “milking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve ” Truly Kant preferred to abstain from such a practice.

When applied to the notion of Will, Kant’s worldview demands that in observation the Will but be caused. However, Kant allows that the Will, which is free, might actually reside in the Noumenal world and in action appear to us in the Phenomenal world as Newtonian reactions to their causes. Due to the nature of the realm that the Will presides in, one is unable to reason about the Will to determine if it is actually free or not according to Kant.

Modifying the Theory

All through out the Prolegomena, Kant talks about the conditions necessary for human experience. Consciousness, which is at the root of human experience, is in its essence, awareness. The concept of choice is so intertwined with the concept of awareness and with it consciousness, that it cannot be separated. If we are beings that are conscious, then we must also be beings that are free to choose. The concept of choice is also a necessary condition for the possibility of human experience. Human experience is possible, the reader is engaging in human experience even as this paper is read. As a result, the reality of human experience actualizes all necessary conditions for its existence.

Once the necessity of human free will is demonstrated, we must fit it into Kant’s worldview since we utilized the worldview to draw forth its necessity. Because all events in the Phenomenal world must be casually ordered as a condition of human experience, then the free will must lie within the Noumenal world. Behind every possible choice that the will can make there are conditions. The man reading the newspaper at the beginning of this paper could have decided to do nothing. If he had decided to do nothing there would have been an array of causes and conditions that would have lead him to decide that choice. This principle is illustrated in the below diagram.

For each choice, not matter how small the probability that the choice would be made, there are causes and conditions that are actualized when ever the choice is actually made. Before the choice is made there are multiple causes and conditions that could be actualized by the will deciding what conclusion they would lead to. The will chooses which choice to make and in doing so, sets which causes and conditions determined the choice.

Conclusion

When viewed in the Phenomenal world one can only see the choice once it has been made and therefore the choice is seen as having been determined. This is still in line with Kant’s view. In addition to that, the will does exist in the Noumenal world, yet we are able to know that it is free due to the fact of our own experiencing. The will is able to both be free and be determined by choosing amongst several options of determinations for each choice that is made. In a stick Kantian view is view would be valid, save for the necessary free will part. Yet, as the same way Hume limited himself in his methods and all that was needed was a little change in direction, Kant too is not above mistakes and the theory can be modified in the above manner as to allow the necessity of a free will while still maintaining almost all of Kant’s previous principles.

Works Cited

Hume, David. 1977. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Steinberg, Eric. Second Edition. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Kant, Immanuel. 1977. Prolegomena to and Future Metaphysics. Translated by James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason. http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/k/kant/immanuel/k16p/k16p23.html December 15, 2004

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