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Henry Imler July 8th, 2005
The following was brought up by a fellow alumni of Columbia College, Carmen Price. The paper was given at the 2nd Annual Philosophy Confrence at Columbia College. The confrence topic was personhood; the title of her paper was “The Necessity of Considering Motivations…” I do not have the text of the paper, so this post will work off of her handout, my notes and my memory.
Her formal argument from her handout is as follows: (conclusions are in bold)
The Necessity of Considering Motivations Notes
by Carmen Price.
- If S is a Person, then she is capable of reason.
- If S is capable of reason, then she is capable of acts directed by reason.
- It follows that if S is a person, then she is capable of acts directed by reason.
- S is either capable of acts directed by reason, or not capable of acts directed by reason, but not both.
- If S is a person, the it is not the case that S cannot commit acts directed by reason.
- S is either capable of acts not directed by reason or not capable of acts not directed by reason.
- If S is not capable of acts directed by reason, then S is not a person.
- If S is a person, then S is capable of acts not directed by reason.
- If S is capable of acts not directed by reason, then S is susceptible to some influence other then reason (i.e. motivations)
- If defining S as a person requires that S is capable of reason, then defining S as a person also requires that S is susceptible to motivations.
The implication of the paper is that personhood must require non-rational action, or the presence of emotion. This means that purely rational beings are not persons. This has some intersting implications in the personhood debate.
Using this argument, which I believe holds, Aristolte’s God, and most people’s ideas of Robots cannot be persons. So, it would seem that God, if it is a person, must have emotion as a quality. Likewise, in order for a Robot to be considered as a person it too must be capable of emotion.
What do you think?
- Philosophy
- Comments(4)
[...] If we are to accept Carmen Price’s conclusion[1] that in order for S to be considered to be a person, it must be capable of non-rational behaviors, otherwise known as emotion; then what does that mean for personhood theory? Must all persons have a non-rational basis? [...]
[...] The lynch-pin of the argument and one of critisms of a perfect and unchangeable God is number six. In excersizing free will, one is changed, whether or not that one is a person or God. Further more, I like what Rhoda hints at towards the end of the post, where he implies that does not employ mere logic in His excersie in free will. This point was first brought to my attention by Carmen Price, a philosophy doctoral student at Washinton University in her capstone paper at Columbia College: “The Necessity of Considering Motivations…”. [...]
[...] The lynch-pin of the argument and one of criticisms of a perfect and unchangeable God is number six. In exercising free will, one is changed, whether or not that one is a person or God. Further more, I like what Rhoda hints at towards the end of the post, where he implies that does not employ mere logic in His exercise in free will. This point was first brought to my attention by Carmen Price, a philosophy doctoral student at Washington University in her capstone paper at Columbia College: “The Necessity of Considering Motivations…”. [...]
[...] we are to accept Carmen Price’s conclusion that in order for S to be considered to be a person, it must be capable of non-rational behaviors, [...]