Henry Imler August 29th, 2007

When I started this program last year, my primary training had been in philosophy. My view of the study of religion consisted primarily of the study of what W.Z Smith’s calls systems. As such, I actually thought that my time in the program would consist of intimately learning about the various systems of ideas (whoops). The ensuing reality has been quite a departure from this earlier perception.

An influential axiom from undergrad was Aristotle’s dictum that “without the same set of definitions, nothing can be agreed upon.” As such, a universal definition of “religion” is highly desired. Such a definition would make the study of religion all the easier. W.C. Smith does a good job outlining not only the commonly used definitions of religion, but also outlining a history of the development of those ideas in the “West.” However, as W.C. Smith points out, any such definition of religion encounters problems. Not only is the term polyvalent and therefore without careful distinctions there is confusion, but also the hard categories ascribed within the term often do not correlate with what others would call “religion,” indeed, if these others even have a similar term in their language. In ancient Rome, religion primarily meant something like “duty” and this duty to the gods was not for personal gain, but rather for the good fortune of the community. Similarly, the closest term to religion in Sanskrit is “dharma” and while its meanings are more polyvalent than the West’s “religion,” none of the possible reasons closely resembles the definitions ascribed within the term religion. After all of this (and more) is considered, there is no easy, hard definition of what religion is, this leaves in its wake a considerable conflict with this paragraph’s opening dictum.

Not only are there the pragmatic concerns with the defining of religion, there is, in addition, moral concerns that need to be addressed in the creation of the definition. Primarily, there are moral implications of the effects of the definition on that which is defined that have been and easily can be overlooked. The process of the defining religion inscribes it with certain attributes. When one then studies the “religions” of other peoples, these certain attributes are then inscribed onto the people studied. This inscription of attributes onto the essences of other peoples raises white flags. What if these inscriptions are rejected by the people they are inscribed upon? What if no one bothers to ask them if they accept or reject these attributes? How does one name the other? Does one ask the subaltern for their permission? These are still do’s and how’s. There are still should’s that need to be considered. If one says that an atheist couple is performing a religious function when they are getting married at the courthouse and if you were to ask them and they deny it, what happens then? Are they merely deluded, fools, or worse? Is W.C. Smith right? Should one disavow the term religion?

Despite the above problems, it would be hasty to drop the term completely. While W.C. Smith is correct in saying that the term has a slippery definition, he is not correct in calling for its removal. The need for careful distinctions, subtlety, and nuance with a term is not warrant for dropping it from use. That is tantamount to intellectual laziness. J.Z. Smith rightly notes that religion is a term that describes a particular aspect of what the scholar is studying, not a wholly independent category. Operating from this approach allows the scholar engage people in a much more valuable manner.

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